


一些采访和讲话

by Veronica_zkx



Category: Political RPF - Russian 21st c.
Genre: Other
Language: 中文-普通话 國語
Status: Completed
Published: 2020-01-16
Updated: 2020-01-16
Packaged: 2021-02-19 11:16:51
Rating: Not Rated
Warnings: Creator Chose Not To Use Archive Warnings
Chapters: 9
Words: 26,875
Publisher: archiveofourown.org
Story URL: https://archiveofourown.org/works/22276720
Author URL: https://archiveofourown.org/users/Veronica_zkx/pseuds/Veronica_zkx
Kudos: 2





	1. 鹦鹉姐姐的很早很早以前的采访

It is “Cross-examination” on the air. As always, Vladimir Averin and Elena Zelinskaya are in the studio.

这里是正在直播的“交互询问”，演播室中依然是您的老朋友弗拉基米尔和艾琳娜。

Averin: First of all, let's introduce our guest: Natalya Timakova, Press Secretary of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Deputy Head of the apparatus of the government of Russia.

A：首先，为您介绍本次节目的嘉宾：俄罗斯联邦总理新闻秘书，政府办公厅副主任，娜塔莉娅.季马科娃。

Timakova: Work in the government seriously differs from work in the Kremlin. And so, within the first half of a year I had to improve my methods of work, because, after all, this is quite another job. It only looks like it is all the same.

T：在政府和克宫工作有很大的不同，在过去的半年里，我需要调整原有的工作方式，因为这两项工作只是看起来相同，实际却完全不同。

When you work in the Kremlin you are actually working for one person - the president. And the president’s administration is an apparatus focused on one man. The government is a very large structure, which in addition to the prime minister includes deputy prime ministers; there are ministries, and the government apparatus, which is also a very important and large body. Strictly speaking, you should actually work not only for the prime minister, including his image, which in many respects takes its shape from the image of the government. And the government is new, with many new ministers who are not as well known as the previous ministers. Therefore, in general, it turned out to be not a simple task.

在克宫的时候，你只需要为总统工作，整个办公厅也只对总统一人负责。 而政府是一个庞大的结构体系，除了总理之外还会有副总理、部长，各个部门和政府办公厅，他们也是很重要的。从严格意义上来讲，在政府，并不只对总理一人负责，还包括他的形象，这在很多方面会形成政府的形象。政府是新组建的，有很多新接受委派的部长，他们没有前任部长那么出名。所以说，这并不是一项简单的工作。

Averin: At what point did you feel like a politician?

Timakova: A press-secretary is a person who helps another person to establish his relations with the press; in this sense, it is unlikely that the press will be interested in me or my opinion. They are more interested in the opinion of the person I represent.

I started to write about the President when I worked with “Moskovsky Komsomolets”. I do not remember how it happened, but an election campaign started at the time.

It was the pre-election campaign of 1996.

Zelinskaya: And who was the president at that time?

Averin: Yeltsin.

Timakova: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was. It was the election campaign. I think that experienced journalists just didn't want to make these senseless trips around the country, and there was an incredible number of such trips. I was young and healthy, that's why I was somehow very quickly appointed for this work. It was an incredibly interesting time. Firstly, because it was the first time that I had a chance to see the country. We visited 20 cities in a very short period of time.

Yeltsin did not hold the public’s confidence at the time. And, in many respects, the goal of this campaign was to try to regain the confidence of the people. And Boris Nikolayevich, to his credit, put 250% of his energy into this. We, healthy young people, were dead on our feet. Sometimes we would wake up in a hotel and we did not know what city we were in or what day it was.

In what way did the career change? Of course, there is a radical difference between the work of a journalist and a person engaged in contacts with the press, isn't there? But, nevertheless, there is a common course, isn't there?

In this sense, there were very interesting impressions of the first three to four months of my work in the White House. The election campaign of the “Yedinstvo” (“Unity”) party had already started and I was involved in it. During the first three to four months I was dismayed by how many foolish things I managed to write over these years, how completely wrong I was about so many things.

Now the situation has changed greatly. If you remember the year 2000, when press-secretaries in many departments were purely nominal people, who, in the best case, sent press releases, let's acknowledge that the situation has changed a lot, and that now the level of professionalism of those people, who coordinate the work of the authorities or business with the press, is much higher. Moreover, the authorities and business – everybody understands how important this is.

Zelinskaya: The profession was created right before our eyes. This profession had not previously existed.

Timakova: Yes, this profession simply did not exist. I remember very well when I started to work with the Kremlin. As a matter of fact, the press-service of the Kremlin was rather good; it was then headed by Igor Ignatiev, a very well-known and respected person. But lots of things were decided by the security service of the president.

Zelinskaya: In the rating of the most influential women in our country you come in third. What does the influence of a politician mean, for example, and the influence of a journalist? Is there common ground in this term – “influence” - and what is the difference?

Timakova: Of course, there is. I think that the most important thing is reputation. And both in the case of a journalist and in the case of a politician it is fundamental, and not even for the ratings, but simply for perception; for voters’ perception, if we talk about politics, or for readers.

Averin: A surname with a good reputation, that is.

Timakova: Yes, for me it's a surname with a good reputation. Reputation - that is the first reason; secondly, there is professionalism, of course; and, thirdly - and here is the fundamental difference - the most important thing for a politician is his political position, and it is desirable that he defends it and adheres to it. It does not matter if I like it or not, but it is important that it exists. And in journalism, it is exactly the opposite. And now, unfortunately, a political position often poses as professionalism and both journalists and their work are depreciated from the point of view of the profession, and it becomes much more important what point of view you voice. Once again, I say that, unfortunately, both the state media, and the opposition ones are guilty of this. Indeed, a political position has become a substitute for the profession. I don't like that at all. I believe, it's wrong when in order to make it a little bit nicer for us, we shut our eyes to some facts; we pretend that in an interview this person has only said this, and he has not said that; let us cite this quote and hide this other quote - all this is, of course, is very wrong. And being a representative of this profession, in the place of the journalistic community I would pay special attention to this approach.

Averin: First to the profession, and after that to one’s beliefs?

Timakova: Yes, afterwards to one’s political views. Because lately, it seems to me, that putting personal beliefs ahead of this is beginning to destroy the profession.

It seems to me that the task of the head of the press-service, or PR-service, or public relations service is to properly prepare a leader for various activities and to organize them, rather than to walk about with a broom and cover up his tracks.

Averin: Now, tell us, please: working for a lot of years at the press-service, working as the press-secretary of the head of the state or of the government, do you express the opinion of your boss?

Timakova: Well, yes, in general, it is my job.

Averin: All the same there may be situations (I can come up with a few) when your personal opinion on this or that matter does not absolutely, I would say, coincide with the opinion of your patron.

Timakova: You know, in this sense, I guess, I was lucky with the leaders, because all the heads of the administration with whom I worked, and both presidents - Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev - are people with whom you can and should speak. For example, if I had any doubts on this or that occasion, I was always able to express them, and I still do so. But here is an important point, because you can express your opinion in the process of discussion, but if your boss has made this decision and he believes that it must be that way - then I'm sorry, your own opinion about this remains your own opinion. And if you are faced with an ideological clinch, then you must, of course, get up and leave. It cannot be done otherwise. But once again, I appreciate that in all these years of work I have always had the opportunity to express my opinion and to be heard.

Zelinskaya: And to convince. Were there any cases, when you could make your boss change his mind?

Timakova: There were cases, perhaps, when it was possible to convince; it's alright, I repeat, it is a kind of a professional dialogue, especially when it is not about politics, but, for example, about forms, or about what is the best way to do something. Later, at some point, of course, experienced politicians already have a feeling for so many things and they sometimes understand better than you, what to do and how to do it, and in what time.

But, of course, it is impossible to manipulate politicians of this level, which we are talking about.

All this is, frankly speaking, such a strong illusion, a big exaggeration. Firstly, because they receive information from a very large number of sources, not only from their press secretary. If we speak about Dmitry Anatolievich, he is an active Internet user, so it's easy for him to collect all opinions and all there is on this occasion.

Zelinskaya: We know that your patron, Dmitry Anatolievich, actively participates in the virtual world. He is an active Internet user and reads and listens to it. Does the opinion of this community really affect his opinion?

Timakova: Of course, it does influence him.

Sometimes he gets upset, especially in view of the fact that sometimes our Internet, unfortunately, like all of society, to put it mildly, does not behave quite correctly. And sometimes he gets upset not because of some sharp criticism or something. If the criticism is constructive and on business, then this is quite normal, and, in general, there were quite a lot of cases when something he read or saw made him give some instructions or make some additional decisions. But as for this kind of total everyday rudeness, it is, of course, frustrating and it upsets me, too. I do not understand people who write, for instance, on Facebook: "Now, well, Dima, you are cool". Honestly. He is not Dima for you. He is the head of the government. It is not necessary to call him Dmitry Anatolyevich, but at least call him Dmitry and address him formally, if you please. This is, in principle, the rules of etiquette.

Zelinskaya: Even if he is not the leader.

Timakova: That is, if we speak about the things that are frustrating for him on the Internet, these are the facts. And a few times we have discussed this, for example: we do have accounts on social networks in foreign languages. And the nature and tone of discussions is totally different there. Unfortunately, it is a shame, because, as a rule, people write on business there. It can be very critical things.

Averin: But the presentation is quite different.

Timakova: Yes. The presentation is quite different. It is always respectful, always with arguments, never with the sole desire to insult, but to convey one’s position, in order, perhaps, to try to influence.

Averin: This is one side of the issue, when we are dealing with everyday rudeness, when a person is bad mannered and has at his disposal a tool like the Internet. On the other hand, there is what is called a political campaign. From 2000 to 2013 there was an incredible number of these well thought-out, organized political campaigns. How to deal with this?

Timakova: Well, that's a part of our political landscape today, unfortunately. It seems to me, it is largely due to the fact that our political system has not yet lived through some of its history. Therefore, for example, in those countries where there are different parties representing different opinions it is possible there to clear up some things at the level of inter-party discussions, or some public debates. In our country this process is only starting to form. Therefore, the mass media, especially the Internet, is often perceived as an instrument of such discussions; and not the best and most honest methods are often used.

Well, I think these are simply certain costs of development. This is a general lack of a political culture. It seems to me, we just have to live through some political history in order to make these things...

Averin: And you personally, haven’t you been tempted to simply turn off the power switch: close down some periodical, notable for this?

Timakova: No, not at all. How can I close down a periodical? No. I have worked out a different principle for myself. At least that's what concerns me personally. Unfortunately, I must read everything there is about the leadership, about the Prime Minister, about the government in order to understand all threats, evaluations and opinions, because they are often not without reason.

Averin: Being a woman on a man's team, do you feel any discrimination?

Timakova: Yes. There is a cliché: I'm not a woman, I'm a colleague. You know, on the one hand, I am glad that our society is not yet like the Western...

Averin: Where everybody is a colleague already.

Timakova: Where everybody is a colleague already. Yes. Here, they will still hold a door for you, let you pass forward, and say a compliment. It is all the same.

Zelinskaya: And for those of our listeners who will not see the TV record and have never seen Natasha in person or her photos, we can say, and I better let Volodya say that she is a young and very attractive woman.

Averin: Very attractive.

Timakova: The question of women in political positions is a delicate issue. If you take over this task, then you should not say: "I'm a girl and so I wear a dress...” You are under certain conditions. And it is not acceptable to cry, or do something like this, I believe.

Averin: Here's more about the rules. Look, for example, the rules of the Western policy mean an unconditional openness, even an accentuated openness. And for the sake of political PR you can see Obama with his wife, his children, in his garden, Bush with his dog, or something else. There is this openness of private life during the election campaign. Our prevailing rules are such that the private life of the president, the private life of the prime minister, the private life of ministers is closed in general. This is due to the specifics of the country because we are used to this.

Timakova: It seems to me, this is due to the fact that we don't have respect for private life. Not only for the abovementioned first persons or ministers, or someone else, but even for each other’s private life. Unfortunately, it is this way thanks to many years of the Soviet Union and the absence of a personal life in principle, when people discussed who was unfaithful to whom and how he did it at party meetings, and wives turned to the Communist Party Committees in order to bring their husbands back. Unfortunately, it seems to me that we should pass through some stage in order to, first of all, learn to respect our own privacy and only then, perhaps, we will be ready to treat with respect the private life of other people. It seems to me, this, too, is a common problem. Conditionally speaking, we can recall the example of Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva. During the time she was with Mikhail Gorbachev as the first lady, she heard nothing good in her address. Nothing was all right: the way she used to accompany him; the way she dressed; and the fact that people did not have a good standard of living, while she always looked good. And there, I repeat, probably many of the complaints were just. But it once again demonstrated that we were not prepared to understand women at the moment.

Averin: That proves another thesis: that there are more demands of a woman in politics in Russia, than of a man.

Timakova: This is true. This is a masculine world and the political world is especially masculine.

欠了多久的债orz，每次看见这么长，就没有毅力翻译下去QAQ


	2. 熊总2015年工作报告（弃了

尊敬的谢尔盖.叶甫根尼耶维奇，尊敬的瓦连京娜.伊万诺夫娜，尊敬的各位议员同事们，  
大家好。

今天我发表的政府工作报告十分特殊，因为杜马选举在即，我们也共事了快有五年。

毫不夸张的讲，政府和联邦议会的合作达到了值得赞扬的高度——我们一同解决经济和社会领域的很多问题，当然，我们的立场并不一致，有时甚至截然相反，从而引起一些争论，但这很好。这些争论会促使我们找到更加正确可取的解决方案，并为我们的国家负责。

我想要感谢各位，为这些年你们与政府的合作，为你们对我们所提出倡议的支持，为你们的理解和倾听——这是政府同国家杜马之间开展有效合作的必要条件。

由于一些负面因素，我国的经济一直处于压力之下，这些因素我已经在这里再三提到，当然，我仍然想要对此进行讨论，以便我们能够更加全面的了解到去年与今年所发生过的事。

第一是油价和其他商品价格走低。  
重要的不仅是下跌的程度,而且还有下跌的速度，我们看到在过去的几十年中，油价有过几次的速度下降。但去年，石油的价格在六个月内下降了近50%,这个速度是前所未有的。 没有任何一个国家的经济能很快适应这样的戏剧性下降。这对我国经济来说是个严重冲击。

第二个因素是关于对俄制裁。俄罗斯仍然面临着国际信用资源分配和现代市场技术遭切断的现状。

第三个因素是世界市场的不稳定和不可预性。政治考量对世界市场的影响正在加剧，正如各位切身感受的那样，这比经济规律更加强烈。

最后一个因素，也是最主要的——也正是我想强调的，因为我认为这是最重要的因素——是我国经济结构本身存在欠缺，这些问题的存在，使当前的危机变得更严重。我们就这个问题讨论过很多次，当然，在这里也是。

这些因素综合在一起，对于我们的国家来说是致命的打击，在上个世纪九十年代就曾出现过这样的情况，在那种压力下，当时的国家生死未卜。但是如今，我们不仅存活了下来，而且我们还有能力发展和前进。 当然，我们都清楚，政府所能做的就是给经济社会分发大笔资金，以此支持银行业这种依赖于商品出口和获得外国贷款的发展形势。但是我们不能这样，更重要的是，我们绝不能依赖这些资源。


	3. 2016年冰球世锦赛开幕式致辞

德米特里·梅德韦杰夫：

晚上好，莫斯科！  
晚上好，尊敬的各位来宾，尊敬的法塞尔先生。

对于所有曲棍球球迷来说，今天是伟大而特别的一天。曲棍球是最壮观和迷人的运动。

第八十届冰球世界锦标赛即将开幕。本次冰球世锦赛能在莫斯科和圣彼得堡举办，对于我们而言是莫大的荣幸，同时，也是庆祝俄罗斯冰球七十周年的纪念日。全世界的人们都热爱曲棍球，在俄罗斯，它已经是一个全国性运动。

我们尽力让本次世锦赛成功举办，为运动员和球迷们创造良好的环境，莫斯科新建了“冰宫”，而圣彼得堡的赛场也已经重修完毕。在世锦赛过后，这些冰球场将会用于举办其它比赛。年轻的运动员可以在那里进行训练。他们中的许多人在未来将会成为世界冠军和明星。

那么我们会做什么呢？我们会全力支持我们的国家队，我们会为他们欢呼！当然，我们也支持其他队伍，因为俄罗斯尊重每一场诚实而公正的比赛，尊重个人才能和团队精神。无论冠军花落谁家，我们都一定会保证体育精神才是最后的胜利者，保证数百万球迷可以从比赛中领会到体育竞技精神。

我衷心的祝愿各位参赛选手在莫斯科和圣彼得堡可以拥有好运气和强健的体魄，祝你们取得好的赛绩，当然，也尊重他们的竞争者。  
我相信大家将会看到一场盛会。也希望各位来宾，在我们的国家会留下美好的回忆。

下面我宣布，2016年世界冰球锦标赛开幕！

【完】


	4. 新现实：俄罗斯与寰宇挑战

结构性危机与俄罗斯日程

当今时代，俄罗斯和世界各国都面临层出不穷的优先方向、新挑战和新应对。本文将试析当前全球经济中直接影响俄罗斯国内形势的重大变化。这些变化一方面带来发展机遇，一方面设定限制，我们必须考虑。  
因此，本文既不列出详细的行动计划，也不描述具体的经济工具。这些都是单独话题。我们首要关注总统和政府的日常决策。当然，《2018年前俄罗斯政府主要工作方向》已经确立了大政方针，而日常工作则遵循《2015年社会稳定与经济持续发展保障计划》，即通常说的《政府反危机计划》。  
当前世界还有多个紧张点，局部性、地区性危机和其他危机依然存在，这种不稳定局势短期内无法改善。俄罗斯的情况也是如此，迅速恶化（尽管不久前外界预测都持这种论调）的可能性不大，但是，恢复新千年前十年发展速度的可能性也不大。问题不仅在于地缘政治和制裁，政治和制裁只能用来解释一部分问题。其实，地缘政治和制裁从本质上缘于国际秩序深刻转型这一更具共性和基础性的原因。  
俄罗斯的困境和难题何在？问题不仅在于克服新老困难、危机现象、短缺和失衡。这些工作当然非常重要，当前情况的确相当复杂，但是，更重要的是确立我们的最终战略目标和战略任务。即便这一目标看上去还很遥远，实现道路相当崎岖。这个目标其实不难归纳，就是跻身（其实我更想用“突破”一词，但是用军事术语可能欠妥）高福利国家行列。衡量高福利国家的标准是人均国内生产总值，以及劳动生产率决定的经济发展质量。  
用社会经济指标、人力资本、文化水平等指标衡量，俄罗斯在无疑是现代发达国家。但是俄罗斯经济的质量还比较差，劳动生产率与最发达国家相比差的不是一点点，而是数倍。而且，这一局面甚至还不仅是去几年或过去几十年造成的。国家绝对主导的中央集权经济模式迅速瓦解，导致了巨大损失，此后依据惯性形成了原料型经济模式，这两种模式均未能有效缩短差距，尽管过去10-15年俄罗斯福利水平与发达国家的差距明显缩小。  
在这样的经济历史背景下，上文提到的战略任务的确称得上史无前例。如果仅凭经济发展的惯性驱动，或者只是不同程度地应对外部条件，未必能完成这些任务。实践证明，任何“赶超式发展”都是不可能的。而且，差距还可能继续拉大。  
如果我们将主要精力都花在用客观情况解释既有问题上，差距加大的风险还将加剧。例如，国境长度、气候、领土跨度和人口密度，这些都不是最致命的，他国实践可以为鉴。加拿大和澳大利亚人口都不多，大部分国土人口密度都不大，但两国都是发达国家。日本则正相反，人口多，国土面积小，资源匮乏。无论一个国家条件如何，情况如何，资源禀赋如何，都可以拿“客观条件”当说辞：土地多了不好，因为难以开发；土地少了也不好，无处安居没地种粮；资源少不好，进口依赖度高；资源多了也不好，其他工业发展不充分；人口少了不好，劳动力不足；人口多了也不好，粮食问题不好解决。  
显而易见，要达成既定目标，就要下大力气改革，开启新的发展模式，显著提高竞争力。这绝不是传统的肉类、奶制品、拖拉机、钢铁生产全面“赶超”的发展模式。要学会让自身更快更强，这是在复杂多变的世界实现目标的唯一道路。  
原料型经济模式也要改，但是，在当前原料型商品价格走低的背景下，改革要慎之又慎，首先要考虑改革对老百姓生活的影响。哪些阶层在改革中无法独立生存，需要政府提供多少扶持，对这些都要有客观清醒的认识。  
局势发展迅速，并非所有人都做好了应对变化的准备。有的人是心理上没准备，有的人是客观条件不允许。我们在决策时要优先考虑儿童、残疾人、老人、低收入家庭等社会群体。  
经济社会领域和就业市场的结构性调整总不免带来阵痛，加之外部因素导致的困难，政府改革的任务可谓难上加难。既要在如此复杂的条件下推进结构性改革，又要兼顾人民生活水平不明显下降。  
俄罗斯的发展是全球发展不可分割的组成部分。没有俄罗斯就没有全球发展议程。但是，俄罗斯无法单独制定全球发展日程，也不能只管本国的发展和公平而无罔顾全球日程。

我们所处的世界  
我们在讨论全球发展的现状和前景时正在越来越多地使用New normal这一术语。五年前，全球金融危机最尖锐的阶段结束后出现了“New normal”的提法，并迅速流传开来。New normal，“新常态”，或者可以翻译成“新现实”。所谓新现实，就是今后一个时期，到下一次大型结构性危机到来前，全球经济的主要特征。其实，新常态这个提法本身值得商榷，但是，过去几年，这个提法不仅在政治经济话题中频繁出现，其指涉的概念也有所拓展，在地理和内涵上都有所拓展。世界主要国家都开始进入新的发展轨道。不仅仅是速度的增长，也有质量的增长，新的生产领域不断涌现，其分布的地区也日渐扩大。  
发展中国家也在向新的发展模式过渡，并对世界经济结构产生重大影响。过去，美国一旦发生经济危机就会波及所有国家，所以，美国市场始终处于关注焦点。如今，即便美国市场不衰退也会出现危机，例如，中国经济增速放缓。  
很有可能，我们正在见证这种新危机的第一阶段。最近几个月中国经济和世界经济的表现就可以说明这一点。全球股市无一例外地对中国股市的震荡做出反应，多国货币汇率也受到人民币贬值的影响。国际原油市场行情不稳定也是一个因素，当然，国际油价与中国在全球经济中的地位亦有关联。显而易见，中国经济未来的发展态势将引起更多关注。增速放缓是中国经济向新阶段过渡的主要特征，中国正在经历经济发展模式转型。  
结构性经济危机可能导致经济发展严重滞后，拉大既有差距的危险。但是，危机也创造增强经济实力，加大政治分量的机遇。危机，总是“危”与“机”并存。从“第三世界到第一世界”（李光耀如此概况新加坡经验）的飞跃通常是在结构性危机期间通过勇于创新实现的。而且，这里所说的创新既包括技术创新，也包括制度创新。世界各国摆脱落后状况的实践可谓佐证，如德国、日本、苏联、芬兰、韩国和新加坡。  
全球经济图景正在迅速改变，从与我国经济最息息相关的能源行业的变化就可见一斑。  
那些过去听起来十分新鲜的，广告宣传般的局部因素正在改变着世界经济体系，改变全球政治平衡。液化气的大规模运输使各大洲孤立的市场连成整体。页岩气的开采正在使能源进口国变成能源出口国。几百家中型创新企业对全球能源市场（包括多国经济）的影响几乎可以与大型能源集团相匹敌。而且，这些企业的表现相当稳定，国际油价降至原有水平的三分之一也没有导致其大批破产。当然，如果油价持续走低，情况或将发生变化。但是，新技术的活力超出的确超出了各方的预期。这是一个十分深刻的教训：如果已经看到第四头鲸鱼的身影，就不要固执地声称大地驮在三头鲸鱼背上（译者注：一些古代文明认为，大地是一个圆盾，由三头鲸鱼驮着）。  
同样，也不能忽视太阳能开发，以往重我们对此重视不足，要鼓励电力、混合动力、水动力发动机的研发。如果这些领域的研发工作顺利，油气价格不再下跌，世界将会见证比“页岩气革命”规模更大的革命。  
大型能源公司正在调整发展战略，分化产能，倾向于开设经济体量不大，市场应对灵活的小型工厂，这是能源业发展的一种趋势。昂贵的大型能源基础设施建设和投资回收周期长，投资回收期内，市场需求可能发生重大变化，能源价格可能大幅波动，所在国政策也可能调整。以往，上述因素都更稳定些，如今，计划周期和预测周期均大大缩短，正如能源战略师所言“世界正变得越来越快”。  
创新遍及技术、经济、人文等各个领域。一篇文章显然无法列举所有趋势，但是以上问题还是值得分别阐述。  
技术创新趋势。第一，技术不可预见性增强，加大全面技术预测的难度。第二，数字技术实现物质世界全覆盖（如需要，也可以说对个人、企业，甚至国家虚拟生活的全覆盖）。第三，新工业化。新涌现的工业技术和工业行业更依赖高品质研发和近便的消费群体，劳动力支出因素权重下降。第四，新技术转换的方向更多从民用转向军用，以往新技术推广的方向正相反，多从军用转向民用（创新多见于军事工业综合体）。  
社会领域的创新决定人力资本的质量和国家竞争力。社会创新趋势有：第一，全球范围内的人才竞争成为国家战略决策的关键要素。人才竞争将日趋激烈。可以预见，今后几年，这种竞争将引发全新突破。例如，机器翻译的质量问题若能解决，语言障碍将不复存在，这将极大促进劳动力资本的跨国流动。第二，将出现符合发达国家国情的新型福利国家。其突出特点在于教育、医疗等领域的个性化服务。第三，社会不平等加剧将最终超越经济政治因素成为直接影响经济社会稳定的关键要素，也将制约经济增长。  
最近一个时期出现的经济创新趋势有：  
第一，个性化的产品和服务取代标准化批量供应的产品和服务。当然，这是新个性化，而不是历史上工业时代之前手工业时代的个性化。新个性化提倡根据消费者的差异需求量身定制。  
第二，新型金融工具扩大新项目的投资边界。金融创新在某种程度上也是全球金融危机的结果。世界各国均无可选择地要开发新更加灵敏的新型金融工具，而不是使金融工具一般化或者禁止使用某些金融工具。  
第三，相比使用传统工业门类，新兴门类资本周转速度加快，经营性支出与固定资产支出趋向等额。企业市场灵活性和技术灵活性显著提升（页岩油气开发就是最近的例子）。  
第四，新型全球化和随之而来的新型贸易保护主义。地区性（国家间）自由贸易组织将有能力解决世贸组织几十年来无法解决的问题。汇率调整成为比海关税率更为强大的市场保护工具。各国政府将更加关注本国经济体系创造附加价值的能力，而不仅仅是保护本国海关关境。  
第五，宏观经济挑战日趋突出。与技术的不可预见性趋势相似，宏观经济的不可预见性也将加大。包括部分不可视决策的不可预见性。例如，2008年，许多国家推出了强大的金融疗法（一些国家要重点对付通胀，一些国家的主要问题是通缩），如何在应对危机的同时避免高通胀就成了一个问题。货币刺激本身就颇值得质疑，如何戒掉这个“毒”还是问题。虽然许多国家大幅下调了贷款利率，企业贷款积极性依然低迷。大型跨国公司积聚了大量储备却不用于投资。也就是说，国际资本目前正处于一个不确定的观望状态，和对即将到来的新常态的担忧状态。现在不是企业债务的问题，而是国家债务的问题。如果有能力发行储备货币的国家的债务前景，温和地说，还难以揣度；那么，不具备发行储备货币能力的国家的债务就根本无法偿还。在当前的特殊情况下，世界经济和国际货币金融体系将走向何方，令人信服的客观说法还不存在。

国家和社会如何应对这些挑战？怎样才能既不落后还能追赶？提高创造性，增强进取心，推动不间断教育，恐怕是正确应对时代挑战，应对日益增强的不确定性和多样性的核心手段。于国家、于企业、于个人皆如此。创造性是人固有的特质，国家的任务在于鼓励人们在各个领域积极创新。

新时期技术进步的上述特征决定了最为重要的趋势：全面解放（或者，一般叫做“经济自由化”或者“搞活经济”）经济，实现现代社会的去官僚化。必须牢记，“世界正变得越来越快”。  
当然，政策或者具体决策不符合国际发展议程，甚至违背国际发展议程的例子也略见不鲜。例如制裁。但是，应当看到，能达到预设目的的制裁并不多见。制裁迟早会取消，国家间关系也会恢复正常。

我们和西方国家的关系亦如此。尽管危机尚未消除，但恢复合作的潮流不可逆转。俄罗斯在经济、政治和情感上都不会离开欧洲大陆。自叶卡捷琳娜二世在《新法典起草委员会训令》中提出“俄罗斯是欧洲大国”已过了近250年，世界在两个半世纪内发生了沧桑巨变，但是这一判断现在和将来都是真理。任何人也休想切断我们和多样的欧洲文明的天然联系。未来，俄欧关系可能会调整，但是开展合作，发展伙伴关系，在条件允许的情况下建立统一经济空间的战略方向坚定不移！

俄罗斯的地理位置和地缘环境不仅能够，也要求我们更加积极地开展“东线”合作。不仅要和中国、越南、韩国和亚太各国密切合作，也要和分布在世界各大洲的上合组织和金砖国家成员国深化合作。把俄罗斯的这种合作意愿解读为“转向”是错误的。强调东向合作，不仅缘于历史联系，我们和许多东方国家拥有共同的历史或者面对相似的当前国际局势。更重要的是，全球发展议程、市场动态，金融贸易技术的流动态势都告诉我们，对这一地区和国家估计不足将酿成战略后果。

增长的质量：战略、方向和重点

《2018年前政府主要工作方向》设定了俄罗斯经济社会发展的许多关键参数、目标数据和风险。政府工作的长期任务和具体落实办法在《2030年前经济社会发展战略》中有具体描述。  
首先，要确保中长期经济快速稳定增长。这就必须面对两种风险。

一方面，人为增长的风险。这方面要吸取我们自己的教训。1986-1989年，加速经济发展的意愿过于强烈，尽管当时有一个时期，大约一两年，经济增速的确有所提高，但是最终仍全盘皆输。而且，这个短时期的增长也使苏联外债倍增，苏联解体后这些外债全部由俄罗斯接盘。

另一方面，对低速甚至零增长的心理适应并接受其为既成事实。过去几年的政治经济评论中已出现这种苗头。如果这种心理在社会中占了上风，将会导致长期衰退。这就是当前我们要一手抓经济增长速度，一手抓经济增长质量的原因。

当前对转变增长模式的呼声很高，这是合理的，因为俄罗斯经济发展的外部和内部条件都发生了重大变化，有些方面甚至发生了全面转变。关于外部市场金融资源注入带来的发展动力接近枯竭的言论已经足够多。可以补充一点，这种增长对投资环境并不十分敏感。

改善企业经营环境、提高劳动生产率是当前的首要任务。为各类经济主体营造舒适的经营环境是确保经济增长质量的通用公式。要集中精力做好宏观经济、结构政策、人力资本、国家治理四个方面的工作，这是决定经济社会面貌的主要领域。

保增长的宏观经济前提：  
确保宏观经济稳定是改善经营环境的首要条件。低通胀率和财政平衡是国家持续发展的主要保障。  
要在三年内将通货膨胀率下调至4%。这是改善人民生活，稳定企业信贷，确保经济总体可控的重要条件。  
保持过去15年取得的两项宏观经济成果：财政平衡和低国债率。联邦预算要平衡，地方预算也要平衡，当前地方债务问题仍比较突出。  
财政支出结构和支出效益与财政平衡同等重要。首先，要从长期发展的角度制定更清晰的财政支出规划。世界上许多国家的理论与实践证明，要优先投资人力资本，包括医疗、教育、科技，甚至基础设施。当然，有限的财力使人力资本投资力度不足。但这并不是说发展人力资本不重要。用牺牲预算质量保平衡是得不偿失的。其次，提高财政支出效益其实并不是新问题，但增效在当下非常重要。  
经济增长趋缓时不能用提高税负来解决财政困难。政府已通过决议，今后几年不会上调税率（也可能下调）。此外，不能增加非税收入。

结构性改革的主要任务：  
必须确保宏观经济稳定，但是仅有稳定还是不够的。低通胀率和合理预算不会直接拉动增长。  
要制定有利于增长和改革的金融机制。这项工作历来重要，当前尤其迫切。俄罗斯面临外部资金渠道受阻和油价下跌的双重压力。而且，至少要做好石油价格长期走低甚至极低的准备。这要求我们更加重视国内融资，国内储蓄，上调储备标准。  
国家投资无疑发挥着至关重要的作用。尤其在当前，国家投资在一定程度上弥补了私人资本投资不足。我们正在做这方面的工作，利用特定的融资渠道（工业发展基金、央行支撑的项目融资等）划拨更多资源，提供国家担保。我们也动用国家福利基金这一重要的资金渠道，运用投资优惠和投资合同等国家刺激手段。  
但是，不能总以国家投资作为资金的主要来源。国家也不能无限制地投资，不能变成印钞机，无限增发货币的自由是最危险的自由。拿西方货币刺激的经验解释是站不住脚的。首先，货币刺激通常在通缩的情况下采用（与我国情况正相反）。其次，刺激效果难以令人满意。第三，刺激措施本身也会变成问题，未来如何解决尚未可知（看看那些对美元前景的悲观预测就够了）。  
而且，国家在经济中占比过高也会客观制约其他资金投入的渠道。国家参股和控股的企业费用支出的增长速度往往高于私营企业，部分投资项目甚至出现资金外流。  
各级政府要高度重视吸引私人资本。过去几年，因为资金充足，我们对这项工作重视不足。现在，联邦政府、地方政府和基层政府都要全面分析制定刺激私人投资的措施，而且要鼓励企业在当地投资。  
国内储备也是重要的资金来源。因此，要重点考察和利用养老金。这是经济运行的一个关键问题。养老金和各类保险都是长线资金。要重视非国有养老基金可靠和高效的特性。要学会使用养老金。因此，政府要高度重视养老金，有效监督非国有养老基金的使用是财政调控的重要任务。  
尽管地缘政治困局、制裁和各种限制依旧，但是，不能忽视吸引外资。不重视吸引外资等同于接受了强加给我们的孤立逻辑。  
吸引境外投资将主要用于技术转型。我们在很多关键领域的技术还不强。高技术产品出口在我们的出口结构中仅占1.5%。因此，对外资的理解不仅仅是资金（吸收了很多资金，派什么用处呢？），也包括专利技术。  
进口替代也是政府工作的重点。这并不是一时的口号。上世纪部分拉美国家在进口替代的指导下对国外投资者关闭国内市场，大量贷款扶持本国工业，最终导致财政破产的情景仍历历在目。我们要从中吸取教训，进口替代不是用价格更高质量更差的国产货代替进口货。  
当然，部分特殊领域和部分产品不惜任何代价也要实现国产化。但是，这并不适用于整个国民经济。理想的进口替代应当使本国产品在国内外市场具有同等竞争力，能出口说明产品有竞争力，进口亦如此。这样的进口替代国家应当扶持。  
我们要单独谈一下增强竞争力的问题。竞争力不足会降低市场经济的效力，甚至使市场经济失去意义。当前这个问题尤为重要，卢布贬值客观上限制了商品进口，制裁和进口替代又使这一矛盾更加突出。这些都会使我们原本就过度单一的经济体系更加脆弱。国家对部分国资可以不参与的经济部门的参与程度不降反升对竞争力的损害也很大。中小企业贡献不足也令形式更加不容乐观。  
监察检查机构改革将促进竞争力的提升。有形无形的“指挥棒效应”常常引发非理性的做法。这些做法不仅会弱化政府监督职能，还造成实际工作中的监督不到位或监督缺位。目前，针对小型企业的检查和反垄断处理正在减少，这是政府转变监察检查功能的具体举措。  
最后，下岗职工社会安置、职业培训和再就业，增强就业市场灵活性，发展小型企业也是提高经济竞争力的关键条件。建立健全全国就业信息数据库（包括用人单位的待遇和福利），通过劳动力跨地区流动计划（从其他地区吸引劳动力）等等只是第一步。这些措施还不够，我们在这方面的经验还有待积累，甚至教训多于经验。集中（常常是强制性）调派劳动力的传统不符合当前劳动力市场的特点。劳动力流动所需的社会基础设施尚不完备。  
上述条件不足和缺失会从政治和社会的层面制约经济发展，也会导致就业过剩和生产效率低下。  
人力资本的维护与发展  
100多年前出现的福利国家的概念已然落后于时代。福利的增长和人口变化的新趋势都要求我们重新审视原有的做法。  
同时，人力资本的竞争日趋激烈，人力资本的流动性日益增长。住在一个国家，工作、学习、医疗在其他国家已屡见不鲜。我们无法回避这种竞争。而且，人们更愿意在本国的不同地区间做出选择。总的来说，这就要求我们对相关领域进行结构性调整。  
教育领域，要解决日益突出的结构性问题。首先，如果用经济学概念界定教育，我们正面临高等学历人才过剩，中等职业技术人才短缺的问题。其次，今天的高等教育基本上变成了大众化教育，这不能不影响高等教育的质量。因此，必须提高高等教育的准入门槛，狠抓高等教育质量。  
终身教育也是教育领域的重要问题。如今，“学习学习再学习”几乎会伴随人的一生。包括成年人电脑技术入门和进阶培训，成年人新职业培训在内的继续教育问题也提上日程。对中学毕业生的吸引力和对投资者的吸引力是评价现代大学办学水平的重要标准。当前，教育竞争日趋激烈，如果高校和其他教育机构的人才培养方案不符合现实，或者只是在形式上呼应现实，那么其必将在竞争中处于劣势。而且，我国高等院校，尤其是知名高校不仅要国内领先，还要具备国际竞争力。这是教育医疗要共同面对的关键问题，如果优质的教育医疗需求都在国外，那么国内的需求就会下降，国内教育医疗服务的质量就无法保障。  
要解决上述问题，我们还有许多工作要做。例如，通过设立专项基金等方式为致力于改善教育机构办学条件的公司提供优惠。要改革函授教育体系，建立全国性开放式教学平台。要对毕业生就业状况不佳的高校进行改革和重组。  
医疗领域的问题并不比教育领域简单，甚至更加复杂。融资采购从未使用过的先进大型医疗设备，提高医务人员收入，都是切实的工作，但还不足以解决所有问题。  
可以列出一长串医疗领域亟待解决的管理和技术问题。包括优先发展初级医疗救助服务，编订诊疗记录（临床医疗救助建议），发展远程可视医疗，推广个人诊疗一卡通，即用一张磁卡记录患者的所有信息，方便其到不同的医疗机构就诊。  
其实，提倡择医就诊，鼓励医务人员和医疗机构之间的良性竞争，是提高医疗保险吸引力的重要手段。医疗保险并非在所有国家都百分之百有效。但是，只有在真正推广医疗保险的前提下才能评价其效果。  
推广医疗保险困难重重。既要考量保险公司的因素，也要兼顾价格和质量的因素。但是，我们既已做出选择，就不会半途而废。不过，只有国家免费医疗的规定简单清晰，商业医保才有发展空间。  
养老金征收管理是经济社会的基础性工作。在这里，我们不是要讨论退休年龄，或者如何用财政弥补养老金缺口。关键要做到“不同年龄差异化对待”。  
俄罗斯劳动力人口绝对数下降的趋势让我们必须认真对待提高退休年龄的问题。如今，延长中老年劳动人口有效劳动年限已经不仅仅是社会问题，而且是经济问题。可以说，劳动人口数量减少，而国家经济持续发展的例子并不多见。这也是俄罗斯面临的一项严峻挑战。  
还有退休人员的社会管理问题。许多退休人员即便有子女，也无法及时获得必要的帮助。这里的帮助并不一定指经济帮助，更重要的是时间和精力上的付出。志愿者、社会组织可以提供一些帮助，健全相应的政府机制也是十分必要的。  
养老金与人口变化趋势类似，惯性作用比较突出。今后，我国可能出现退休人口与在职人口数量相当的局面。这必将引起税收提高，养老保障水平下降等极其严重的后果。为避免出现这样的局面，我们的经济、财政、社会和养老金都要提前做好准备。  
改革中的非经济要素  
要保持经济发展，就必须显著改进政府服务水平，增强国家治理能力。  
首先要保障人身财产安全。政府要坚定地保护私有权，限制恣意妄为，以确保经济长期稳定发展。合理的制约和均衡机制可以保护企业经营积极性不受不合理的行政司法打压。  
健全有竞争力的俄罗斯法律体系至关重要，这也要求司法体系提高效率。这是一个综合性问题，既要做出制度调整，也要改变教育体系，尤其是改变传统和实际操作。  
法律效率与经济效率同等重要。二者息息相关，前者是后者的必要条件。  
形成统一的司法体系是司法改革的重要举措。但是，这只是第一步，调整工作方法尚不足以达到预期的效果。要改革司法体系，将高素质的新型人才吸收到司法队伍中来。要使用先进的信息技术，提高司法体系和司法决策的透明度。  
国家治理能力建设是当下的热点话题。这是一项系统工程，包含改进政府机构作风，建立健全决策机制，提高战略规划能力，使用先进管理技术，加强人才培养等方方面面。  
要建立各级政府机构决策责任制。当然，要赋予政府机构相应的法律和财政资源。各类政府项目拨款和规划，干部的评价和任用要与明确的业绩标准挂钩（最终业绩）。  
刺激投资积极性是当前国家治理的重要任务。这在很大程度上取决于政府改善投资环境，支持企业向各行业各地区投资的决心和能力。要把这项工作的绩效纳入各级政府的考核指标。  
政府决策体系如缺乏完整性或连续性，就不能称之为“系统的”体系。国家战略规划法为系统设定治理目标提供了法律依据。然而，这并非要恢复苏联式的官僚计划体系，而是要对自身行为进行监督。如若当前的战术决策与长期目标相悖，要保证战略目标不至沦为口号。

综上所述，可以用以下原则性结论概况我们当前面临的国际国内变化：  
第一，全球金融危机之后出现了涵盖经济社会各方面的“新现实”。世界主要大国进入以增长速度、增长要素、增长质量为特征的新的增长轨道。上世纪末世纪初评判经济发展的许多标准都要重新审视。非大型企业的技术与创新在短期内改变了市场和多个行业的总体面貌。这拉动了包括大型长期项目实施办法在内的市场行为重构。  
第二，用许多社会经济指标评价，俄罗斯都是发达国家，要以发达国家为参照解决俄罗斯的问题。同时，我们也具备发展中经济体的部分优势，我们可以也应该发挥这些优势，应对当前危机和长期挑战。我们的国际地位决定我们必然要面对更多的挑战和困境，但这不是引以为傲的自我安慰的理由。正是俄罗斯成为发达世界有机组成部分的决心引起了我们潜在的竞争对手的反制。最近一个时期的地缘政治压力在很大程度上源自这一因素。  
第三，必须打造符合俄罗斯当前国情的新型发展模式。全球危机过程中正在产生新的、长期的“游戏规则”。新的经济模式要确保俄罗斯经济在中期快速稳定发展，经济增速要超过世界平均水平，增长要伴有本质性、结构性的进步。  
第四，人力资本竞争成为国际竞争的关键领域，人力资本的重要性日益突出，成为推动现代生产的最活跃的要素。世界各国更加清醒地认识到，有能力吸引高素质创造性人才的国家才能保持领先地位，对人力资本的争夺将日益加剧。  
第五，迅速变化的世界不断提出新的挑战，有效应对这些挑战必须解放经济。发达国家和许多发展中国家都已意识到这一点，并努力创新，推动资本和技术转型。  
基于上述结论，要确保国家稳定发展，就必须优先完成以下任务。  
第一，确保宏观经济稳定，财政平衡，持续稳定地将通胀率下调至目标水平。这可以提高经济的可预见度，增强对国民经济的信任。此外，下调通胀率应与下调市场利率并行，降低企业和个人贷款门槛。  
第二，提高财政资金使用效益。优先投资基础设施和人力资本。财政平衡必须以今后几年不加重税负为前提。  
第三，坚持贯彻吸引私人资本的方针，提高私人资本对经济发展的贡献。国家当前和今后都将继续鼓励投资积极性。但是，国家刺激不能无度，国家更不能代替私人投资者。吸引私人资本的能力应纳入相关国家和地方主管部门及领导的考评体系。  
第四，国内储蓄应当成为资金的重要来源。这是一项长期战略任务，要向这一目标努力。要考虑有效使用养老金。养老金和各类保险金是经济发展的“长线资金”。  
第五，发展中小企业是经济增长企稳和确保社会稳定的重要先决条件。中小企业的发展态势是国家经济社会健康发展的重要指标。  
第六，刺激竞争。对企业稳定和地方稳定的忧虑是当前竞争不充分的主要原因。健全劳动力市场既是社会问题，也是经济问题。治标不治本会限制优质就业岗位的快速涌现。  
第七，刺激非原料型出口增长（出口绝对值和出口比例同步增长）。此外，这也是进口替代真正发挥作用并产生积极效益的证明。  
第八，全面提高国家治理能力。要建立多层次的政府机构决策责任制。对干部的考评和项目拨款应与治理绩效挂钩。现代决策体系必须具备完整性和连续性，当前决策不能与已经公布的长远目标相悖。  
经验证明，仅仅制定正确的方针还是不够的。要向全社会广泛宣传我们的方针。更重要的是在实际工作中落实这些方针。这才是我们的根本任务。


	5. Russia and Palestine: Moving forward

November 11, 2016, 08:00

Dmitry Medvedev's article.

There are places in the world that astound us all with how many treasures of civilisation they possess. One such place is the holy land of Palestine, a cradle of cultures and religions, a long-suffering area of clashes and age-old conflicts, a place of historical memory and ceaseless pilgrimage. Palestine’s history is awe-inspiring. Some of the most important spiritual and political currents of the Middle East region, and indeed of civilisation as a whole, converge here. This is why my coming here is much more than an ordinary foreign visit.

Moscow highly values the decades-old friendly relations between Russia and Palestine. We have supported the Palestinian people since the Soviet era and have always called for a fair solution to the Palestinian issue based on UN Security Council resolutions and General Assembly decisions.

The Middle East today is the setting for dramatic events and human tragedy. The lack of foresight on the part of certain leaders, who failed to steer their nations onto the path of modern development, and the irresponsibility and egoism of other leaders, who decided that they had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of others in order to achieve their own ends, have turned this potentially very prosperous region into a conflict zone. Terrorism and sectarian strife are threatening all countries not only in this part of the world but practically everywhere. But it is here that we must start unwinding the knotted disagreements that are a source of instability around the world.

The Palestinian issue has been overshadowed recently by the dramatic developments in the region. But Russia has always upheld the firm position that its resolution is a top priority and an essential condition for a comprehensive and just settlement in the broader Middle East. The fate of the Palestinian people and their statehood is an indicator showing to what extent the leading regional and global powers are prepared to deal with the most pressing issues of global development.

It is extremely important to expedite the resumption of the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue in order to finally resolve the issue of the coexistence of two equal states. Moscow will never abandon this position of principle.

Our country’s relationship with Palestine officially began on 30 November 1974, when Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), visited Moscow. In 1976, the PLO opened a permanent mission in Moscow, which was transformed into the Embassy of the State of Palestine in 1990.

Our bilateral cooperation has been developing in many areas. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visits Moscow for a confidential exchange of views with the Russian leadership on a wide range of regional and international issues. Russia’s top leaders have visited Palestine three times. President Vladimir Putin visited Ramallah in April 2005 and June 2012. I have fond memories of my visit to the ancient city of Jericho in January 2011. I had the honour of opening the Russian Museum and Park Complex, which was built on land Russia purchased in the 19th century. The greatest ornament and relic of this place is a sycamore that is known as Zacchaeus’ Tree and is mentioned in the Gospels. As a gift to the Palestinian people, a multifunctional complex on Vladimir Putin Street in Bethlehem was built.

We are focused on expanding economic cooperation. Of course, it is difficult to get round the unfavourable factors created by the challenging military and political situation and overall instability in the region. But our efforts have met with some success. In April 2015, we created the Russia-Palestine Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation and expect it to make a big contribution to the development of our bilateral business partnership.

Our bilateral trade is modest so far, but there is an upward trend. For example, trade between us grew by 2.3 times in 2015 compared to 2014. Moreover, the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) have created highly favourable conditions for Palestinian goods by lifting customs duties on Palestinian imports to this integration association with 180 million consumers. In the past few years, we have signed several intergovernmental and interagency agreements that will boost bilateral cooperation.

An array of new bilateral documents will be signed on the sidelines of my visit to Palestine. Work is underway to promote an even more favourable atmosphere for progress, mutual investment, and industrial, agricultural, trade and cultural cooperation.

Palestine is in a difficult situation and Moscow regularly provides it with substantial financial assistance on a bilateral basis and through international organisations. Over the past several years, in keeping with established practice, Russia has provided significant financial resources to Palestine to meet its current budget spending: a total of $40 million was provided for these purposes in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2013.

In 2015, an additional $5 million was provided to Palestine for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip, which was damaged by the Israeli attack in July and August 2014. In response to Mahmoud Abbas’s request, in August 2014, the Russian Government provided funds to procure medications and medical equipment for the population of the Palestinian enclave, which was essentially cut off from the outside world.

Russia will also finance the upgrade of Bethlehem’s historical and religious centre: the renovation of Star Street abutting the Church of the Nativity. Among other things, this is about our civilisational responsibility for the fate of Christian shrines in Palestine. We are grateful to the Palestinian leadership for its energetic assistance in our effort to reinstate and strengthen the Russian cultural and historical presence in the Holy Land. There are three landmark projects there. In Bethlehem, on land given by the Palestinian authorities to the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society, we have financed the construction of a Russian centre of science and culture. In 2014 a secondary school for boys was opened there. It has offered a Russian-language course since 2015. I will bring Russian language textbooks for Palestinian schools when I go to Palestine for a visit.

Russia traditionally provides assistance in training Palestinians in specialties that are in demand now and particularly for the future. Thousands of Palestinians hold degrees from our country.

The Palestinian leadership and the entire Palestinian people face numerous, urgent challenges that are aggravated by the general atmosphere of uncertainty that prevails in the Middle East today. Palestinian statehood, which is still young and going through the difficult process of formation, is especially vulnerable. I would like to offer assurances that Russia has been and will remain a reliable friend to the Palestinian people. We will do all we can for your country’s well-being and security


	6. 【161002】Dmitry Medvedev's interview

Valery Fadeyev: Mr Medvedev, when can we expect to see economic growth?

Dmitry Medvedev: Economic growth depends on a large number of factors and is determined by both our domestic environment and, of course, external conditions. The world is experiencing a very serious slowdown in economic growth. Moreover, Russia’s economy is unfortunately shut off from foreign sources of financing and from a large number of foreign companies that provided our manufacturers with orders. I am referring to the sanctions, the so-called external pressure on our country. I’ll be frank: it is bad, but it is not crucial.

Structural problems have accumulated in our economy over decades – that is, distortions in the economic system. I often hear people ask: why don’t you work on this issue and why haven’t you changed the structure of the economy yet? But such challenges cannot be overcome in one or two years, or even a decade – because the current structure of Russia’s economy stems from the Soviet economy, which had developed for 50-60 years. This is the economy we have. It has both advantaged and disadvantages, but it needs reforming. That is why the economic growth depends on our success in these reforms.

Nevertheless, we expect the negative factors that have emerged in our economy in the past two or three years to exhaust themselves by the end of the year. Due to the Government’s efforts and the overall improvement of the economic situation, we expect to achieve slight economic growth – that is, GDP growth, with our other macroeconomic conditions being rather good. Our sovereign debt is low; we have substantial foreign currency reserves comparable only to those of the world’s top ten countries. The inflation in our country has decreased, with the price growth slower than it was in the past decades, and at the end of the year we may achieve an all-time low inflation rate in our modern history. This gives us reason to expect further economic growth.


	7. 接受周六新闻采访摘要

Sergei Brilyov: The Government you are heading has become the most stable Government in the history of new Russia. On the day this programme will be aired it will have been in office for four years, four months and two days. If we look back at the conditions in which your Government started working… Back then oil cost $110 per barrel. The exchange rate was 30 roubles to one US dollar. Many things have changed since then, both in the economy and in the world. There is less money but the obligations remain the same. 

Dmitry Medvedev: We try to accomplish everything that is needed, even in this quite adverse economic environment. No matter what anybody says, I don’t believe there is a single financial analyst in our country who could have forecast such a rapid decline in oil prices. Yes, they fell in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. But no one could have expected a three-fold fall in oil prices over such a short period of time.

Nevertheless, Russia has survived and continues to develop. If we talk about what has happened in these years – and various things have happened – we have achieved some substantial and, I believe, serious results. I would indicate one area – probably, the most important one. Not that long ago, average life expectancy in the country was five to seven years lower than it is now. Now the average life expectancy is 71 years. Of course, this figure is not as high as in Japan or some highly developed European countries. But this is ten years more than the average life expectancy for men just 10 years ago. Another area: not that long ago it was fashionable to say that our country is gradually becoming extinct. But in the last two years we have achieved absolute population growth.

Sergei Brilyov: This is not because of migration.

Dmitry Medvedev: Not because of migration but because of the growing birth rate. Last year we gained 30,000 new Russian citizens. Let me reiterate: this figure does not include people relocating from other areas or other countries. This is why, even in such difficult conditions, if one concentrates efforts, energy and resources in a certain direction, quite significant results can be achieved. In the last 15 years, pensions – in the nominal terms, I would like to stress – grew by almost 15 times. In absolute terms the growth is not that big, although it is tangible if compared to 2000.

Sergei Brilyov: The second half of this year has been more successful than the first in terms of the economy?

Dmitry Medvedev: Of course, I can’t say that all of us are satisfied with the state of the economy. The situation is difficult, and not very stable yet. But, nevertheless, the economy has started its recovery and this gives us a chance to go back to the rules that were in place until recently. Moreover the decision has been taken, it has already been announced and, naturally, we will abide by it.

Sergei Brilyov: It may exasperate our TV viewers if I ask you a question about the United Kingdom’s electoral policy considering that we are on the brink of elections in Russia. My question is not about the British people but about Brexit, which was voted in a referendum this summer. The UK is leaving the EU. This was a very important signal to the rest of Europe, which lost 15% of its economy almost overnight. The UK’s GDP amounts to 15% of the European GDP.

It is clear that the British people voted, first and foremost, against two things: an influx of refugees – and there are hordes of refugees taking the European Union by storm – and the very strange EU administration system, where officials are not accountable for their work.

Yet there is a feeling that nobody has learned a lesson from this. Because this week, without any preliminary consultations, somewhere in the depths of the European Commission a decision was made on the automatic extension of sanctions against Russia (if we turn to issues that are more relevant to us). And, in general, there is a feeling that we are losing Europe. It is getting weaker economically, it cannot cope with the refugee crisis, and, mostly important, it doesn’t really know what it wants. Europe is turning from a reliable partner that it used to be into a neighbour you never know what to expect from. What are your thoughts on the subject?

Dmitry Medvedev: I have very mixed feelings about what is happening in Europe. Moreover, I feel sorry for many people living in the united Europe. Why? Europe has always been a comfortable environment, a good place to live. We followed its example in developing different areas of our country, and we still have some things to learn from it. But I believe the problem is that unfortunately, the European Union has failed to think its migration policy through. Europe is really not that big. And before throwing open all the doors to people who find themselves in a difficult situation, I believe the Europeans should have thought about protecting the interests of their own citizens. In each country separately or in the united Europe, in general. But in the end, millions of people, bearers of an absolutely different culture, have come to Europe. I am not even talking about the extremists and terrorists that are also going there. They have basically changed the European landscape. There is unrest in Europe, and unfortunately terrible terrorist attacks are taking place.

Sergei Brilyov: Nice, Munich...

Dmitry Medvedev: Absolutely horrible events. All because of a badly thought out migration policy. I believe that, first, this is a lesson for Europe itself. They have to make some extraordinary decisions to preserve its unity. And we are interested in this. Europe is still our biggest partner. Second, this is a lesson for us. Currently, Russia is a state that strictly protects the interests of its citizens. Trying to serve them no matter where they are. Making decisions to ensure stability and peace in the country. And, as I see it, we have been successful in that recently. Whereas Europe’s example should serve as a warning to us against badly thought out decisions. We need to preserve all our achievements of the latest period from the standpoint of stability, peace, and inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. This is an extremely important task for the state.

Sergei Brilyov: The elections are coming up and one cannot but remember that you were the person behind the political system’s liberalisation, as a result of which there is higher competition at these elections than previously. And, in general, you have made life harder and more complicated for United Russia. Do you regret the decisions you made, for instance, about increasing the number of participants in the elections? What are your forecasts regarding the new Duma? Which new political parties do you envision there? What do you think will happen to the two existing leaders?

Dmitry Medvedev: I have no regrets. It was the right decision, which, by the way, was supported by our party and other participants in the political process. The decision was made back then to increase the number of political forces by changing the legislation – more parties emerged – and simplify their participation in the election process. I believe that political competition increased as a result. This is good. This is what many political forces have been urging us to do and talking about – that we need to develop political competition. And United Russia, as the largest party, approved such decisions by supporting my proposals in the State Duma. As to how far we have complicated or simplified the situation for ourselves… I believe that in general the situation is perfectly normal, because the election campaign is underway, and for United Russia it is unfolding in line with absolutely clear laws. And we expect that it will turn out quite favourably for us. 

But what I think is important is that we started the process with ourselves when we held an internal vote, i.e. the preliminary vote inside United Russia. We basically told our voters: choose the candidates who you think are best suited to take part in the elections. The people believed us, they came and voted in advance at the party elections. This is very valuable, because our list was fully based on the results of the preliminary elections. In other words, we coordinated our actions with the voters in advance. This allows us to hope for support in the elections to be held on 18 September.

Now let me answer the second part of your question. I believe forecasts are a thankless task and the wrong approach. But obviously, there are certain players who have a good chance to keep their place in the future State Duma. I mean the political parties that are present there because they have strong support of the voters.

Sergei Brilyov: And will there be anyone new?

Dmitry Medvedev: Maybe. It depends on how convincing the other parties’ programmes will be. How convincingly they describe them to the voters. And in general, how trustworthy they will appear to the voters. This is why it will be the people who will decide everything on 18 September.


	8. 【141215】Russia and Ukraine：Living by new rules

Article by Dmitry Medvedev

About a year ago, in the late fall of 2013, when the crisis broke out in Ukraine, no one could imagine the fallout of this "bitter November" in a neighboring country.

Society split, dividing even families. The economy turned down. There was an outbreak of radicalism involving in-your-face demonstrations of Nazi symbols. Flows of refugees to neighboring countries. Fighting between fellow countrymen. The result has been thousands of casualties, including civilians.

In a matter of one year only memories remain of the country that was close to us, and with which we maintained friendly trade relations. A country where we went on vacation or to see our relatives. In Russia, it pains us to see this happen. We are helping even those in Ukraine who accept our aid with an ironic smile, continuing to live under the slogan, "Ukraine is not Russia." I’m genuinely sorry that this is the only strategic program for the development of the country that the Ukrainian elite could come up with. As Prime Minister, I see the numbers that confirm that, unfortunately, the worst for our neighbors is still to come.

No matter how they try to attack us verbally, we cannot fall for these provocations. We do not have the right to forget that the people living on the other side of the border are close to us in their outlook on life, culture and mentality, and their fate will always matter to us.

COMMON PAST

How are Russia-Ukraine relations special?

There are many things that unite us. Our relations have their roots in ancient times. Unfortunately, in order to pit our two nations against each other, official Ukraine is denying objective facts, including our common culture, faith and centuries-long common history. They are speculating on the past, imposing ideological constructs that have nothing to do with historical reality. This is understandable: the closeness that has developed between the Russians and the Ukrainians is unique and enormously strong. It was a determining factor in the relations between our two countries after Ukraine became independent, in any case, no less than the economy. It was certainly more important than other factors for millions of people from Russia and Ukraine, whose lives and families have always been tightly knit.

After all, Ukrainian culture is close to every Russian, and we listen to Ukrainian folk songs as if they were our own. Rich in talent, the Ukrainian soil has given the world artists, musicians, poets and writers whose work is our common heritage, such as Repin, Kuindzhi, Yaroshenko, Bulgakov and Babel. Having lived many years of their lives in Ukraine, they maintained warm feelings for it and expressed them in their paintings, novels and short stories. Russian literature was greatly embellished by Ukrainian motifs in the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Kuprin, Chekhov, Blok, Pasternak and Mandelstam. How can one say whether the immortal books by Gogol are more Ukrainian or Russian?

This culture belongs to both our peoples. Tolerant and open, it has always brought us closer to each other and has been a source of concord between us. It brought up in us similar values and ideals, principles of human relations, and rules of behavior in society and family. These are things that cannot be destroyed overnight. Even when we started living in different states, we kept reading the same books, enjoying the work of the same actors and watching the same movies. We kept speaking one language, which almost a third of Ukrainians consider their native tongue and which is understood by everyone in Ukraine. And we thought that there would never be any spiritual or cultural borders between us.

How Ukrainian industry was built

We were united not only by common historical and spiritual roots, but also the close interconnectedness and interdependence of our economies, where manufacturing and production links have been formed over decades.

Back in the 19th century, as part of a single state with Russia, Ukraine emerged as a major industrial region, and the Donets Basin as one of the key mining and metallurgical centres. As a part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine not only became stronger, but in addition to being an agrarian republic, it also became a developed industrial region. Dneproges, Europe's largest hydroelectric power plant, was built in Ukraine by a truly nationwide effort. In a similar manner, under the slogan “All for Donbass!” this entire coal-mining region was retrofitted. Such giants of mechanical engineering and metallurgy as the Kharkov Tractor and Turbine plants, the Krivoy Rog Metallurgical Plant, the Zaporozhstal and Azovstal steel plants and transport infrastructure, including a network of seaports, and a strong agricultural and defence industry have been built. Unique manufacturing and research and technical centres, such as Yuzhmash, Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and the Paton Centre were created.

As a result, Ukraine became one of the most technologically advanced Soviet republics. The bulk of its industry, agriculture and trade was financed from the budget of the Soviet Union. The Druzhba oil pipeline, five nuclear power plants and seven hydroelectric power stations, which now form the basis not only of Ukrainian energy, but also the entire national economy, were built by many people from many Soviet republics. Also, thanks to the scientific and technological potential created in the Soviet era, Ukraine still has basic aerospace technology and can manufacture competitive products in certain aircraft-building segments. Indeed, almost one-third of all missile and aircraft enterprises and design bureaus built in the Soviet times are now located in Ukraine.

How Russia supported the Ukrainian economy

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of this (including the gas transport system) went to Ukraine. In addition, Russia took on the entire Soviet debt. Ukraine entered a new era in its history, free of any burden. That is why in 1991 its initial conditions for economic growth were among the best in the post-Soviet space. And that's precisely why the economy of independent Ukraine managed to remain afloat. Until recently, Ukraine was using its past achievements to survive. It continued to rely on cooperation with Russia. And it used our resources.

In a difficult period for Russia, in June of 1993, our country issued a loan to Ukraine in the amount of about 250 billion roubles. Special support from Russia allowed Ukraine to successfully develop many sectors of its economy, including the aviation and space industry. As a result, Ukraine’s first National Space Programme was created. The level of technical relations, including nuclear power, between our two countries was higher than that of many European countries within the EU. Exports to Russia promoted successful development of eastern Ukraine.

Russian investments in engineering, metallurgy and metal processing, aviation, shipbuilding and oil refining played an important role for the Ukrainian economy, primarily, its basic industries. Russian investments were also a major factor that strengthened the banking sector. The bulk of these investments were made amid the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, when Ukrainian lending institutions were strapped for cash due to a mass-scale loan default and a bank run.

Favourable conditions in the energy sector were created by Russia for Ukraine alone. For a long time (through 2006), the price for gas sold to Ukraine was extremely low, at $40-$50 per 1,000 cubic metres. The amount of gas supplied to Ukraine exceeded that which Gazprom was selling to Germany and Italy combined. Thus, our country was, in fact, propping up the Ukrainian economy for decades.

Since a separate contract for transit was not available, we paid for it with gas. And Kiev was taking more gas than Russia owed to Ukraine for transit. Thus, the Ukrainian debt to Gazprom was mounting. When we limited the supply, Ukraine started illegally pumping, or to be more precise, stealing gas intended for European consumers.

Of course, Russia was trying to negotiate with Ukraine in order to put cooperation on a civilised track, including during the talks between President Putin and President Yushchenko in 2005, when the Russian side proposed giving up barter deals and going straight to cash settlement and separating supply and transit. However, Kiev was extremely unhelpful and demanded special conditions. It wanted to charge European prices for transit and enjoy low prices for Russian gas for itself. The Ukrainian side rejected almost all of our proposals (including the provision of a loan of $3.6 billion to repay its debt). But even in such circumstances, Russia continued to make compromises.

Notably, Ukraine was the last former Soviet republic to adopt market relations in its dealings with Gazprom. In 2009, for the first time in the history of relations with that country, a long-term contract was signed, which is fully consistent with the international practice of doing gas business. On 19 January 2009, following talks between Vladimir Putin and Yulia Tymoshenko, Gazprom and Naftogaz signed new long-term contracts. The price for gas and transit tariffs have since been calculated according to the generally accepted European formula. But even after that Ukraine continued to violate its payment commitments and continued to illegally pump gas. In 2010, President Yanukovych and I signed a new set of Kharkov agreements, according to which Ukraine extended the stay of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 25 years, and Russia reduced the price per 1,000 cubic metres by $100.

Erratic payments only served to accumulate Kiev’s debt. By the autumn of 2013, it stood already at $2.7 billion. But even then, the Russian side helped Ukraine out. On 1 January 2014, Naftogaz was to pay $268.5 per 1,000 cubic metres, a significant discount. This would have allowed Ukraine to save about $7 billion annually. In addition, the Russian Government issued a loan of $3 billion to Kiev, which, among other things, was to be used to pay off the gas debt. But no one was thinking about paying. Therefore, in April 2014, we were forced to cancel the December discount, and switch – strictly in accordance with the contract terms – to the price of around $485 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, which Ukraine didn’t like. Starting in June, Gazprom asked Naftogaz to prepay all its gas supplies. At that time, Ukraine's debt stood at $4.5 billion.

The Russian side has never used the economic factor as a lever in addressing any political issue. So, the signing of the CIS Charter by Ukraine, the establishment of the Russian-Ukrainian state border or the Black Sea Fleet stay in Crimea were addressed on the basis of international law.

Clearly, any move by Russia can be interpreted in a negative way, such as expansion or addiction, which is what some are actually doing. However, they disregard the fact that we are talking about the jobs and wages of Ukrainian citizens and taxes to the Ukrainian budget. But the truth is that the economy of independent Ukraine was created largely owing to Russia’s support. The amount of Russian investments, easy loans and supplies on favourable terms has so far exceeded $100 billion. Ukraine has saved over $82.7 billion on low gas prices alone. Not a single former Soviet republic has ever received that much financial aid. In fact, we were not just helping the Ukrainian economy, in fact, we were maintaining it. It is unlikely that Kiev could have received such gifts for decades from any other country. But, unfortunately, this economic reality was improperly construed by the Ukrainian leadership.

TURBULENT PRESENT

Ukraine on the brink of a precipice

The outgoing year will go down in the history of Ukraine as one of the most difficult and tragic. President Yanukovych negotiated an association deal with the EU, promising a “European choice” for the country, while trying to continue to play nice with Russia. In the end, he looked at the economic analysis of all the risks and possible consequences, and given that there was no guarantee of significant and rapid financial injections from the West, he decided to put the brakes on the EU association process. As a result, the Ukrainian government was toppled on 22 February.

Subsequent actions by Ukraine’s leadership, including its military, have led the country to the edge of economic disaster where it remains poised.

I’m not going to delve into detailed social and economic statistics, especially since many countries, not just Ukraine, are experiencing difficulties, and that includes Russia. However, in the case of Ukraine, we are talking about a 7 to 9 percent decline in GDP according to the IMF and Ukraine’s Finance Ministry, 20 percent annual inflation, an almost 40 percent drop in gold and foreign exchange reserves, a 50-100 percent increase in utility bills, and the closure or bankruptcy of large enterprises. Ukraine is plagued by an external debt which will exceed GDP by late 2014, and it’s unclear if the country will be able to finance it. It seems our neighbours will have to relive the 1990s. The potential for default and the looming threat of social and economic collapse in Ukraine were not dreamed up by political strategists in the Kremlin or anywhere else. Incidentally, much of Ukraine’s debt is held by Russia. Just in the past few years, Russia has invested about 33 billion dollars in Ukraine, including bank capital, loans, and Gazprom money.

The Ukrainian elite tries to reassure itself and ordinary Ukrainians, promising that “everything will work out” thanks to the country’s “European choice,” the EU Association Agreement and “independence” from Russia.

Dictating EU rules to Ukraine

Many of Ukraine’s problems can be traced back to when the leadership in Kiev, clearly prodded by their Western partners, started talking about the need to reduce the country’s much maligned dependence on Russia. Politics prevailed over economics. Major projects, including economic ones, came to be evaluated through the prism of possible changes in the balance of political forces worldwide. After 2009, Ukraine and a number of other countries were essentially pressed into reducing cooperation with Russia and participating in the Eastern Partnership.

In economic terms, the European approach looked more like simply dictating to Ukraine, in detail, what to do in almost all areas of life. We are not talking about a small European country with a population of several million people, but one of the largest countries on the continent.

This fact is clearly reflected in the EU Association Agreement. It requires that Ukraine bring its legislation fully in line with EU standards as part of a “deep and comprehensive free trade area,” despite not receiving EU membership, and to amend it accordingly as EU legislation changes. What this does, in effect, is establish the absolute supremacy of European regulations and directives over Ukrainian laws and, by the same token, over Ukraine’s national interests. A case in point: the obligation to adopt a law on restitution may result in total chaos in matters of property ownership. Moreover, the right to property can be claimed not only by citizens of Ukraine, but also a large number of citizens of Russia, Poland and other countries, whose ancestors owned such property before 1940.

In terms of economic cooperation, the EU-Ukraine relationship looks more like neo-colonialism. Under the guise of “fair” competition, Europe pushed for advantages for European companies and the Ukrainian firms they worked closely with. The European Union needs Ukraine primarily as a source of raw materials and, of course, as a market for European companies. Looking at the structure of Ukraine's trade with the EU, it’s clear that vast majority of imports include consumer goods (food, medicine, cars, electronics, household appliances, etc.), while exports are dominated by commodities.

A significant portion of Ukrainian enterprises will not be able to compete with the European products that will flood Ukraine in the free trade area created under the terms of the Association Agreement, which almost completely abolishes import duties. No one seems to have thought about what will happen to the Ukrainian producers in these conditions. Moreover, no one can say how much real opportunity there will be for Ukrainian enterprises on the highly competitive European market. The total value of preferences to be provided to Ukraine by Europe was estimated at 400 million euros a year. However, that is unlikely to compensate for even a fraction of future losses. Tariff liberalisation, which will cover up to 98 percent of goods coming from Europe, will gradually result in European goods ousting all competitors' products from the Ukrainian market. The second wave of the European trade “tsunami” will carry these goods to the Customs Union markets, harming the business environment within its bounds. Of course, we will not just sit by and watch this unfold. We will respond by drastically reducing exports of Ukrainian goods to Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which could cost Kiev up to $15 billion.

Speaking about Ukraine’s agricultural sector, which accounts for 17 percent of its GDP and 27 percent of exports, its prospects are not very bright, either, despite the fact that the country has always been a breadbasket. Now, Ukrainian farmers, through no fault of theirs, are getting the short end of the stick, in no small part because of the subsidies received by European farmers, which Ukrainians farmers can only dream of. And this despite the unmatched quality of Ukraine’s farmland and the proven high skills of the country’s agricultural workers.

According to experts, under the Association Agreement with the EU, Ukraine will face a discriminatory quota system that is absolutely inconsistent with the principles of free trade. For example, the annual quota for wheat exports to the EU is set at 950,000 tonnes, rising to 1 million tonnes in five years. That means that only 50 percent of wheat exported to the EU will be free from export duties. The rest will be subject to a duty of 95 euros per tonne, which will increase the price of Ukrainian grain for the consumer by at least 50%.

Transitioning to European technical standards and regulations, which the manufacturing industry and agriculture will have to do several years from now, will also come at enormous costs. In some sectors, the transition will have to be completed even sooner. For example, machine engineering will need to switch to the EU standards in just two years. Ukraine will have 5 to 10 years to travel a path that took industrialised countries of Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands, etc.) 50 to 60 years. To understand whether this is realistic, consider the fact that a significant share of Ukrainian enterprises still use Soviet-era equipment and production processes.

It may well be that the estimated cost of these changes provided by the Yanukovych government – 160 to 500 billion euros over 10 years – was overstated. But in any case, it will require major funding, and expecting the EU to cover these costs is simply naive.

Why Ukraine is not welcome in the EU

Unsurprisingly, the funding promised to Ukraine by the West is becoming increasingly modest. An American pledge (note, a pledge, not actual money) of $1 billion was portrayed as a new Marshall Plan. But when Ukraine needed 1.45 billion euros to pay in advance for Russian gas – as a loan or otherwise – the Europeans recognised the need for help, but refused to provide it. In the end, Kiev said it would dip into its foreign exchange reserves, which are themselves heavily dependent on foreign aid.

In fact, no one is eager to give Ukraine money even to cover its most pressing needs. If push comes to shove, Europe may provide a loan to finance Ukraine’s debt, as the country is on the verge of default. But Europe's economy is still struggling to recover from the crisis. Brussels will not help Ukraine the way it helped Greece, Spain, Ireland and others during the 2008 crisis, and even then it took the EU a while to do what was needed. Not all countries were prepared to hand over taxpayer money to help their “European brothers.” Back then, the debate concerned EU members, whereas now it’s about a country that no one is willing to accept in the EU.

Ukraine's leaders are, to some extent, repeating Yanukovych’s mistakes by talking about their country’s “European choice” and the possibility of joining the EU in the near future. But there was one key difference: Yanukovych realised his mistake and tried to stop the process. The current Ukrainian government doesn’t trouble the people with “small stuff.” It doesn’t tell them that Ukraine has assumed all the obligations of a candidate for EU membership without gaining the status of a candidate. Ukraine hasn’t had a public discussion about what’s in the Association Agreement or an honest accounting of its pros and cons for the economy in general, individual businesses and industries, and different groups of the population. For a long time, a Ukrainian translation of the document wasn’t even available.

The Association Agreement does not contain any commitments to accept Ukraine into the EU, nor does it even mention the prospect of membership. No one is talking about the possibility of Ukrainian representation in the European Parliament or other governing bodies, not to mention equal rights on par with EU citizens, European-level healthcare and social services, or visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens.

The EU is in no hurry to give Ukraine a seat at table of European powers as an equal partner. It is not even asking Ukraine to pull up a chair. It’s a courtship that will never end in marriage. Just look at Turkey, which signed an Association Agreement 51 years ago and still is not a member of the European Union. The situation has already become a punch line. Viktor Chernomyrdin, when asked a while back when Ukraine would become an EU member, said: “After Turkey.” “And when will Turkey become one?” came the follow-up. “Never.”

Kiev should also look at what has happened to the economies of its neighbours to the southwest who joined the EU: whether their GDP has gone up or down, what happened to wages and unemployment rates, and most importantly, if there has been an increase in foreign investment over these years or, on the contrary, if it has fallen many times over. For example, after Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, unemployment rose from 6.9 percent to 11.8 percent in a matter of six years. The amount of foreign investment declined over the same period almost nine-fold from 9.051 billion euros to 1.092 billion euros. These countries are not inferior to Ukraine in any respect, and are roughly comparable in terms of economic development and climate.

On a separate note, we should mention the role played by the EU’s desire – back during the times of Yanukovych – to push Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement. As you may be aware, Russia, as Ukraine’s largest trade partner, repeatedly offered to discuss related issues on a trilateral basis (Ukraine, Russia and the EU). Each time, EU dignitaries said that Russia had nothing to do with it, that it’s a two-way process and Moscow should wait on the sidelines. They didn’t want to hear us. We now know what this selective hearing loss has led to. Even the new Ukrainian leadership that replaced Yanukovych is growing increasingly aware that they can’t ignore Russia’s position. Otherwise, the talks between Ukraine, Russia and the EU on association-related issues wouldn’t have been held in Brussels in July, and the parties wouldn’t have agreed in September that certain provisions of the Agreement would be delayed until early 2016. However, there was a dramatic sequence of events between the refusal and then the consent to jointly discuss these issues. And it’s impossible not to wonder what might have happened had Europe “deigned” to enter into the kind of joint discussion which was absolutely normal and necessary in this case? Many tragedies could have been avoided. There would not have been a civil war in eastern Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands of refugees wouldn’t have had to seek refuge in Russia. Of course, we will continue to provide humanitarian aid to those troubled regions. But the Ukrainian authorities – if they really believe that eastern territories are part of Ukraine – should realise that returning things to normal there is primarily their responsibility, just like we assumed responsibility for people's lives in Crimea after it decided to return to Russia in the 16 March referendum. This was Crimea’s decision, and we believe the matter is closed.

Judging by its latest actions, Kiev is not willing to take responsibility for its eastern regions, and Donbass and Lugansk now face an economic blockade imposed by the central government. Is it not enough that Ukrainian troops are shooting at their own civilians? Must they also economically destroy these people and the entire region? This is unprecedented. Or was the hope in issuing the executive order to suspend the work of government organisations, withdraw their property and documents from the region, and terminate banking services for individual and corporate accounts there, that hunger and poverty would make residents of the eastern regions more tractable? Clearly, this is how Kiev sees the peace process. Surely this is the “strongest” argument to convince Eastern Ukraine to follow the rest of Ukraine down the European path.

PRAGMATIC FUTURE

Ukraine erects walls

The current mood in some corners of the Ukrainian elite is reflected in the plans to erect various types of “walls” between Kiev and Moscow: some high and others not so high, some electric or barbed-wire, some backed up by a trench. These props are being moved from the political theatre to the real economy.

We hear that Ukraine is prepared to sever trade and economic ties with Russia, or at least minimise them wherever reducing them to zero is not possible. No gas or engines, and as little oil, equipment, pipes, metal, and construction materials as possible, should pass over the “wall”.

For example, the Ukrainian authorities, with US support, actively promoted a completely unviable project to build the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline as a way to reduce the transit of Russian oil via Ukrainian territory. A lot of effort went into searching for alternative natural gas suppliers, and while this may have helped exercise the imagination, it had no basis in reality.

Russia will protect its markets

I seriously doubt that the strategists in Kiev will be able to realise their plans to end all trade and economic ties between our countries, although, of course, they can still cause severe damage. Both countries are already feeling the effects. Russia isn’t happy about the losses, but economically, it will get over them.

What about those who in their minds are already living “behind the wall”? In the spring, our Trade and Industry Ministry estimated Russia’s total orders placed with Ukrainian enterprises at $15 billion (or 8.2 percent of Ukraine’s GDP). No one in Ukraine has explained – to us or to themselves – how the loss of those orders will be compensated for, or what will happen to hundreds of enterprises and industrial areas, including such unique production facilities as Yuzhmash, which is now on the verge of bankruptcy.

In November, a Russian-Ukrainian carrier rocket Dnepr was launched from the Yasny base in Russia’s Orenburg Region and launched into orbit a Japanese remote sensing satellite and another four Japanese spacecraft. It wasn’t a huge event, but in hindsight it’s revealing: It took decades to build up this cooperation, and now Ukraine is trying to destroy it within a matter of months.

We warned our Ukrainian partners in advance: our relations will immediately suffer if the Association Agreement is applied as written. According to some estimates, the Ukrainian economy will lose at least $33 billion a year. Russia will protect the interests of its producers and its markets.

In September, I signed a directive raising customs duties for goods from Ukraine to the level set by the Customs Union for non-members, and it will be enforced if certain provisions of the trade and economic parts of the Association Agreement come into effect before 1 January 2016. We have also launched a system to monitor the implementation of the economic part of the Association Agreement to look out for EU goods disguised as Ukrainian appearing on the Russian market at dumping prices. The watch list includes virtually the entire range of Ukrainian goods – from pork to ships. If such “Ukrainian” goods are discovered, the appropriate duties will be applied in order to protect our producers against unfair competition.

The agreement with the EU creates other problems as well. If Ukraine complies with its obligations to harmonise the legal and regulatory environment in the country with EU standards, we expect this to result in a sharp reduction of information exchange between our customs services. Ukraine is essentially being gradually stripped of its sovereignty in customs regulation. This will significantly complicate preliminary information exchanges between us as neighbours and impair the customs control mutual recognition system, which helps expedite customs clearance on the border. This is hardly surprising. Instead of communicating through long established channels, Moscow and Kiev will have to talk via Brussels, with Ukrainian officials simply carrying out orders from European bureaucrats.

Because of the differences in technical regulations, norms and standards, Ukrainian agricultural producers will be simply unable to enter the Russian market, as is evident from the events of recent months. As soon as spot checks were conducted on Ukrainian agricultural products, widespread violations of our quality and consumer safety standards were identified. Today, this economic sector has fallen on hard times. The lack of regionalisation in Europe will compel us, for safety reasons, to close our market to Ukrainian goods if there is a disease outbreak in the opposite part of the EU. We see significant risks both for the economies of our Customs Union partners and for other CIS countries, particularly Belarus, which does significant trade with Ukraine.

Risks for Russia

Although not directly related to the agreement, there are a number of other problems associated with this new economic reality in Ukraine. We are alarmed by cases of violations of Russian companies’ property rights and by populist slogans like “don’t buy Russian” heard in Ukraine. While there were isolated cases of pressure long before the events of this year, it is now widespread. Many business owners have admitted that it is becoming increasingly difficult to protect property rights under the new Ukrainian authorities.

Some cases sound more like Makhnovism than European values. In March the press extensively covered the expropriation of a few dozen new KAMAZ lorries by “Maidan self-defence fighters.” The Russian oil company Lukoil, which is able to operate normally even in Iraq, was forced into selling a petroleum station in Ukraine. Armed men raid Russian banks and companies under the pretext that they are funding terrorism. Right Sector commits acts of vandalism in many cities. I’ll note that oversight bodies have had no complaints against Russian banks and companies, which meet all their obligations. It’s a real racket. The fact that Ukrainian securocrats do not protect Russian businesses suggests that it is official policy.

We can’t help but be concerned by the Ukrainian leadership’s effort to scuttle nuclear power cooperation. The attempts to use American fuel in Soviet-made nuclear reactors at Ukrainian stations is a grim example of the dangerous influence that politics can have on the economy. Our nuclear engineers were not consulted. Meanwhile, the experiments conducted under pressure from American producers are not safe. There had already been attempts to replace Russian fuel with American fuel in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, for example in the Czech Republic. These experiments ended in serious technological problems and shut down reactors. Luckily, common sense prevailed and Russia and Ukraine reached agreement on nuclear fuel supplies for the coming year.

Even at the peak of the domestic conflict in Ukraine, Russia fully honoured its commitments to supply nuclear fuel to Ukrainian power stations.

Ukraine planned to build its own fuel production facility with Russia’s assistance. We have already developed a number of production technologies, but Ukraine won’t build the necessary production facilities in the Kirovograd Region.

The risks to pipeline and other forms of transit through Ukraine are growing considerably, despite the major advantage the country’s geography gives it in this respect. Customers are dubious about the safety of shipping by road and rail or using Ukrainian ports. Many customers, and not only in Russia, will probably have to alter the routes of their shipments to Central and South Europe. This calls into doubt Ukraine’s continued participation in East-West and North-South global transit routes.

Meanwhile, working in Russia is the only source of income for many Ukrainians. Russia will have to shut down this source due entirely to actions taken by Ukraine. Starting 1 January, quasi-legal Ukrainian guest workers that make up the majority of arrivals will not be able to work without a permit. We will monitor more closely the length of their stay in the country, enforcing the limit of 90 days in any six-month period. In the past it was possible to leave Russia and come back to work for the next three months without a problem. Now Russian border guards will give more scrutiny to Ukrainian travellers who lack permits.

Ukrainians stand to lose an estimated $11-$13 billion, or about seven percent of Ukraine’s GDP, from not being able to work as freely in Russia. It would be interesting to know whether Ukrainian politicians are factoring in this additional burden on the national budget, not to mention the budgets of Ukrainian families.

New principles for our relations

Revolutionary euphoria seems to have convinced many Ukrainians that they can discard centuries of shared history, start with a clean slate and live better. But the slate is already stained with blood. Ukrainian society is already paying for the illusions fostered by ruling elites who dream of European passports for themselves. We hear every day about the victims of these illusions. Soldiers and civilians in Ukraine continue to die despite the ceasefire. More victims are inevitable in a country where people don’t have enough money to buy food and medicine, or provide for and educate their children – in short, to lead a decent life. We sympathise with them all.

However, Ukraine has made its choice. Even if our neighbours have a very vague idea of the final price to be paid, they are entitled to their opinion, even if it’s mistaken.

Russia, of course, finds it difficult to accept such a choice, but not because of the “imperial ambitions” attributed to Moscow. For 360 years after the Pereyaslavl Rada, we have considered each other family. And like any family, we have occasionally had arguments. But we have always faced difficulties and dangers together. And we have been united in times of joy and trouble, and, of course, in our common victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The best way to prove that Russia respects Ukraine as a sovereign nation is to recognise its right to the choice that it has made. But Ukraine should keep in mind that any choice comes with responsibility. In a prosperous European future, you can’t do the bare minimum, you have to work hard. If you want to live like they do in Europe, first learn to pay your bills – for starters, the bills you owe Russia.

Our countries are neighbours and have no choice but to cooperate. However, from now on, this cooperation will be strictly “European,” i.e. rational and pragmatic. Russia will act in its national interests and firmly uphold them, as with any other equal partner. We will leave our emotions and feelings of kinship out of it, as we proceed to build our relationship in a new environment. And we will no longer be the steward of the Ukrainian economy. It doesn’t make any economic sense. And, frankly, we’ve had enough of it.

Of course, gas transit through Ukraine has been on our agenda for a long time. The gas issue has been resolved for now. According to the agreements reached in Brussels, Ukraine must pay off $3.1 billion of the $5.3 billion it owes to Gazprom before the end of 2014 and prepay in the future. From 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2015, Ukraine will enjoy a discount of $100 per 1,000 cubic metres from the contract price, making the price of Russian gas for Ukraine in November and December $378 per 1,000 cubic metres. In early December, Naftogaz paid $378 million as an advance payment for 1 billion cubic metres of gas.

The “winter package” of agreements was made possible by direct cooperation between representatives of Russia and the EU. The EU understood the threat Ukraine posed to the transit of Russian gas to Europe. And it took steps that made at least a temporary agreement possible. The terms of future cooperation will be the subject of negotiations and depend on Kiev’s strict adherence to the payment schedule.

Another brick in the wall being erected by the Ukrainian authorities are their plans to introduce visa regulations with Russia. But has anyone considered the ramifications this would have for Ukrainians and the Ukrainian economy, and the general deterioration it would cause in relations between our two countries?

The decline in remittances sent home from Ukrainians working in Russia will hurt. As of today, there are almost 400,000 highly skilled Ukrainian professionals who hold work permits or patents in Russia. These are the official statistics that don’t provide the full picture given our close ties and open borders with Ukraine. According to experts, about 6 million Ukrainians are employed seasonally in Russia. Notably, over 4 million Ukrainians have entered Russia since 1 January 2014 alone. This is almost one-tenth of the total population of Ukraine. Russia is a second home to them – a place of family, friends, and work, including seasonal jobs. It’s like the saying, eastern Ukraine works for Russia, while western Ukraine works in Russia.

Perhaps a dash of cold political and economic pragmatism is what our countries needed in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now, after all the hardships and losses, we have a chance to build truly busniesslike and mutually advandageous relations.


	9. 【080524】熊总在北大的演讲

*源百度

德·梅德韦杰夫：

尊敬的中国朋友们，首先请允许我对友好的中国人民所遭受的灾害表示最诚挚的慰问，俄罗斯人民为此感到非常痛心，并尽力而为向贵国提供必要的援助，克服这一次特大地震的后果。

尊敬的许智宏先生、北京大学的教授和学生们，我来北京大学访问，对中国最有影响力的学府特别感兴趣。就在二十天前，北大庆祝了110周年，我为此表示了热烈的祝贺。

我来到一所历史悠久、水平这么高的学府，我有特殊的感情，主要原因是本人曾长时间从事同高等教育有关的工作。有水平的高等院校，培养新一代学者和思想家，他们最终将成为社会名流，也会肩负起科学、经济、政治、文化领域创造新成就的责任。

他们将落实对社会最有益的、最先进的科研成果。就像中国一句话“长江后浪推前浪，世上新人换旧人”。

我不是第一次来热情好客的中国国土，但是以俄罗斯总统的名义还是第一次。我想借我们今天会面的机会，向你们就当今世界教育和人文合作所起的作用阐述我的想法，当然我也愿意给大家介绍俄罗斯和中国战略合作关系的前途，以及这种关系对于两国和整个世界发展的重大意义。

你们都知道俄中关系最近几年达到了前所未有的高水平，发展迅速、内容广泛，很重要的是两国之间给予相互信任，双方一致认为伙伴关系既可靠，又有前途。

俄罗斯和中国是两个伟大的邻居，双边关系的历史有差不多400年，客观上双方有发展合作的意图，彼此又有重要意义。当今时代，两国休戚与共，为双边关系的基础，包括国民经济、教育和科学发展，充满信心地参与世界各项发展。

最重要的是我们两国都愿意提高居民生活水平，使他们未来对家庭生活充满信心，并造福新一代。我认为这都为我们富有成效的合作，未来几十年双赢的双边关系及持久发展打下了牢固基础。双方确信我们将继续合作，增进传统友谊。  
谈到这一点，我想特别指出俄中关系史无前例的国家年大型项目，其主要目标充分实现，两国人民增进了相互理解。我想指出，俄中两国关系的牢固基础就是2001 年签署的《睦邻友好合作条约》。目前，双方成功地完成落实了该条约2005-2008年实施纲要。今年年底之前，双方将通过至2012年的实施纲要，我们对俄中积极合作抱着关怀态度，我们时刻感受到中方和我们同样的态度。

双方成功解决历史遗留问题的典范就是边界问题的解决，这是一件具有历史意义的大事。作为法学家，我想指出，在国际关系中，你们都知道，边界问题是最难解决的问题之一。众所周知，双边边界谈判过程长达400多年，在两国关系没有提升的情况下，完全无法使该问题得到妥善解决，这需要两国人民和国家领导之间达成高度的相互信任和友谊。

我们要通过共同的努力发展两国边界地区之间的合作，携手保护环境。不久前双方签署了《中俄合理利用和保护跨界水协定》，我们期待着该协定的实施能带来具体成果，并愿意以建设性的态度同中方合作，扩大各项环境领域的合作。

我想补充指出，保证环保的高标准对于两国乃至全世界都是一个迫切任务。你们都知道环境保护问题将列入八国集团峰会的议题，而且我们在成为上海合作组织主席国期间也要特别重视这些问题。 亲爱的朋友们，我来到一所高等学府，我想谈谈教育与科技合作有关的问题。我相信未来的世界，教育和文化、新知识和技术决定着人类通往前进的道路。

众所周知，儒学是华夏文明的基础，儒学的意志保证了它不间断的发展，几千年的发展也创造了伟大的中华文化传统。论语的第一句话就是有名的“学而时习之不亦乐乎”。我们知道中国为使更多人受到教育所做出的努力，提高学生和研究生的数量，中国每年派专家到国外研究新技术、新科学和最新的设备。俄罗斯同样以发展教育事业为重点。教育领域的大型国家发展项目，已实施了好几年。我们也鼓励年轻教员，我们致力于通过引用创新技术，从根本上提高生产能力。为按照现代标准改组工业培训新人才。在这方面我们两国积极准备，未来实现一个突破，即突破整个社会的技术现代化水平，并以平等的方式进入全球经济发展领先国的行列。

我想指出的是，俄罗斯正在拟定国家发展长期至2020年的规划。我们很清楚，科教兴国这一政策的实施，对我国具有特殊意义。我们都记得我国最出名的有识之士，保证了我国历史上具有里程碑意义的大事和重要的科学发明。

两国人民好钻研的头脑、创新意识、求知的精神，应该成为我们当今一代共同的基础，使双方能够在经济领域实现突破。我想指出，两国通过携手努力，能够为应对许多全球性的挑战做出实质性的贡献，包括买得起能源和资源、消除贫困、稳定世界金融市场、保障粮食安全。

我想再次指出，解决上述问题的基础是两国要实现科技突破。当然两国要理解自己对地区和世界发展、稳定与安全所具有的责任。

目前，俄中之间全面开展教育领域的交流，研究生、进修生、学者、教员参与这个交流。最近几年建立直接联系的两国高等院校的数量有所增加。例如联合学士教课规划所涵盖的学生的总数达到3000人。从事中文教学的俄罗斯高等院校同贵国的大学保持着最广泛的联系，例如俄罗斯有15000来自贵国的留学生，在中国有4500名俄罗斯留学生，我知道今天在座的也有我国的学生。我想专门指出，在我国愿意学习汉语、了解贵国灿烂文化的青年，数量不断增加。

我确信我们要更积极地发展青年交流，举办更多的联合学生企业科学论坛等文化、体育和娱乐领域的大型活动，为两国青年开展融合科研、技术和文化的项目创造新的机会。

我想介绍一下双方在语言教学领域的合作。在中国，对俄语的兴趣早就有，1708年清朝政府开设了俄罗斯文馆。我知道今天俄罗斯的文化在中国是受欢迎的，你们会读俄罗斯的书和俄罗斯的报纸，也会唱俄罗斯的歌，非常著名的《莫斯科郊外的晚上》成为中国文化不可分割的一部分。

我想指出，俄罗斯的汉学学派始终是世界最强有力的学派之一，19世纪中叶我国几个大学已经有汉语教学。考虑到这些历史传统，两国签署了专门的政府间协定，关于在俄罗斯学习汉语和在中国学习俄语，我们要进一步努力普及这一工作。我们对在中国2009年举行俄语年和2010年在俄罗斯举行汉语年寄予厚望。我深信，目前学习俄语的学生，包括在座的朋友们，很快就会在实践中用到自己学到的知识。

对于俄中的多方位合作与快速发展，我不想提很多的数字，但是从2000年开始，双边的贸易额增加了10.5倍，而且每年平均增长30%左右。俄罗斯目前是中国第七大贸易伙伴，而中国是俄罗斯第三大贸易伙伴。

双方在能源领域、核能领域、科技、航天、通信、信息技术的合作有良好的前途。在这些领域双方将在规划和实施中有很多大型项目，包括在江苏省修建 “天栾”核电站，第一期去年投入了商业运行。对于俄罗斯也有重大意义的项目，在圣彼得堡修建的波罗的海明珠是由中方建设商实施的，包括修建住房、道路，去年商业中心已经开幕。

亲爱的朋友们，我们都期待着今年8月北京奥运会的开幕，我确信北京奥运会将成为精彩的运动会，也会以最高的水平。俄罗斯祝愿北京能够举办一场精彩的、高水平的奥运会。在路上你们也会碰到有名的俄罗斯的政治家、运动员、音乐家，他们都会为北京奥运的成功举办感到非常高兴。对于我们来讲你们举行奥运会的经验值非常重要，因为我们要研究，考虑到我们要举办2014年的冬季奥运会，这个筹备工作已经开始。

女士们、先生们，俄中战略合作伙伴关系成为加强地区和世界稳定的积极因素，我们国家所奉行的是和平、灵活和务实的外交。我们密切合作，允许我们实质影响确定平衡的国际关系，包括亚太地区之内。

我们对上海合作组织所起到的作用，就是俄罗斯和中国积极参与的上合组织的作用不断提高，我对此非常满意。上海合作组织成为保障地区稳定与和平、经济和人文领域合作发展的重要因素。俄罗斯同中国一道主张加深上海合作组织同有关国家和多边组织的对话，俄中双方对建立民主国际秩序的立场接近或者完全一致，我们都认为联合国的作用是不可替代的。当然我们同意联合国也需要进行改革，与时俱进，但是这个改革的目标是提高联合国的效率，加强它能应对各种威胁的能力，而不是使它更加削弱或被替代。

我想再次指出，我们对世界发展能够做出贡献，我们两国对全球经济和人文发展肩负着重大责任。当然，俄罗斯和中国愿意一道采取务实行动、有效打击恐怖主义，也愿意通过双边或多边的行动打击国际恐怖主义。

亲爱的朋友们，最后我想指出，科学和知识的价值不断提高，知识主导前进。与此同时，非常重要的是知识可以使来自不同国家、不同民族、信仰不同、宗教不同的人统一起来，这一点对于瞬息万变的世界，以及现代社会的发展有着原则性的重要作用。

我们两国根据自己的经验知道这个过程非常不容易，具有重大的意义，这需要两国所有人，特别是青年具有志愿，并尊重对方的传统和文化，需要密切的民间交流，也需要继承两国的最好的历史经验，需要我们两国伟大人民的世代友好。我第一次正式出访，对友好的中国进行访问，我感到特别高兴。祝愿各位取得新的优异成绩。

谢谢大家！


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